Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Between Thailand and Russia

Prayoon Phamonmontri

The leader of a Thai Mission to Europe

Indeed it was Thai dissatisfaction with, and distrust of, Japan that led to a restoration of diplomatic relations between Thailand and Russia, which had lapsed after the overthrow of the Tsar.

It was the Thai intention to use the Soviet Union, in addition to Great Britain, to counter-balance Japanese ambitions. While in Berlin, Colonel Prayoon Phamonmontri, the leader of a Thai mission to Europe, was urged by the Thai Premier to proceed at all speed to Moscow to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union.

As a result, the restoration of diplomatic and commercial relations between Thailand and the Soviet Union was announced in Moscow on March 12, 1941, a day after the French Indo-China border agreement was initialed in Tokyo.

Despite the optimism generated by this agreement, the Soviet role never matched Thai expectations.

12Franco-Thai Peace Convention of May 9, 1941

By the Franco-Thai Peace Convention of May 9, 1941, Thailand secured only a part of the territories in Laos and Cambodia which it had demanded and less than that which its armies were said to have occupied.

It recovered part of the territories lost to France in 1904 and 1907, but had to agree to the establishment of a demilitarized zone and to provide monetary compensation to France.

In consequence, there was a feeling in Thailand that Japan was a foe rather than a friend. This feeling derived from Thai dissatisfaction with Japan’s role as mediator and Japan’s evident determination to exercise influence over Thailand’s political and economic affairs.

11An Undeclared War Between Thailand and French Indo-China

When a balance of power was believed to be attained, the Thai Premier, who was backed by an effective propaganda campaign at home, employed force as an instrument of irredentist policy.

On November 18, 1940, an undeclared war between Thailand and French Indo-China broke out. The tide of war went against the French who tried but failed to reinforce their troops from other French territories.

Before Japan intervened diplomatically on January 20, 1941, the Thai Supreme Command claimed that they had occupied all the territories of Luang Prabang which Thailand claimed and an area in Cambodia extending 40 kilometers from the frontier.

Thai press reported alleged that all Laos and Cambodia would have been taken but for Japanese mediation which served to check Thai ambitions.

10Thai Premier’s Verbal Commitment to Japan

Colonel Luang Kharb Kunjara

Thai Premire's agent sent to Singapore

Because of this domestic political pressure, the Thai Premier, who wished to retain power, became determined to deal more closely with Japan.

In exchange for support for Thailand’s irredentist policy in Indo-China, he made a verbal commitment to Japan on October 1, 1940 to the effect that Thailand would no longer pursue a policy of neutrality but would allow its territory to be used by Japan in the latter’s plan to attack Malaya and Burma via Thailand.

To balance this verbal commitment to Japan, the Thai Premier contrived a week later to employ Great Britain as countervailing power.

He sent a secret agent, Colonel Luang Kharb Kunjara, to Singapore to assure the British military authorities that Thailand would resist Japan should she attempt to attack Malaya and Burma via Thailand.

09Thailand’s Offensive Diplomacy

Colonel Luang Phromyodhi

was engaged in this offensive diplomacy

 In these circumstances, the makers of foreign policy in Bangkok were provided with a good chance to play off one side against the other.

This tactic was employed in the full when the Phibunsonggram Government sent “Special Goodwill Missions” to the interested Powers.

In particular a “Special Goodwill Mission”, to Hanoi and Tokyo led by Deputy Minister of Defense and Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army Colonel Luang Phromyodhi, was engaged in this offensive diplomacy.

This mission did not succeed in persuading the French to accept Thailand’s offer of collaboration with the French against Japanese aggression in Indo-China in return for France retrocession to Thailand of two enclaves across from Luang Prabang and Pakse.

But, when the mission arrived in Tokyo in September 1940, it generated anxiety among the authorities in London that the mission might discuss Japan’s military demand on Thailand including the establishment of air and naval bases in Thai territory.

This anxiety contributed to the great advantage of Thailand in inducing Great Britain to adopt a flexible attitude towards the maintenance of the statys quo in Indo-China.

Britain became sympathetic to Thai demand for two enclaves across from Luang Prabang and Pakse. Despite Britain’s approval of Thailand’s “small-scale demands”, the Thais did not think that they could achieve these by entering into direct negotiations with the French.

Neither could Great Britain help the Thais; nor could the Thais change America’s rigid attitude towards the maintenance of the status quo in Indo-China

When the Phibunsonggram Government’s offensive diplomacy showed no prospect of achieving its irredentist aims, the Thai Army and Navy became dissatisfied with the Thai Premier’s conduct of foreign policy.

There were indications that resignation from office would be forced upon him. Should he be obliged to resign, an alternative choice of the Army and the Navy for the office of Prime Minister was either Vice-Admiral Sindhu Songgramchai, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, or Phaya Phahol, the former Prime Minister.

08The Thais regained territories in Laos and Cambodia

Demonstration of the Thai people

to support  their government

Thai determination to prosecute this irredentist policy provoked a crisis over the Indo-China-Thailand border and a short-lived war in which the Thais regained territories in Laos and Cambodia, which had been lost to France in 1904 and 1907.

It marked the first time since the colonial era that leaders had employed both diplomacy and force as means to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Initially, the Thai Government entered into direct negotiations with France. Then having failed to persuade the French to subscribe to its demands, the Thai Government adopted an offensive diplomacy.

Its objective was to draw the attention of other Powers to Thailand’s territorial demands. These Powers were Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy.

The Thais obtained a sympathetic response from Japan, Germany and Italy, which counter-balanced a hostile attitude from the United States and Great Britain. The interest of the latter two powers lay in the maintenance of the status quo in Indo-China in spite of the fact that Great Britain adopted a flexible attitude towards it.

07With the French Defeat in Europe, the Whole Situation in Indo-China Was Transformed

French Indo-China

With the French defeat in Europe in June 1940, the whole situation in Indo-China was transformed. The makers of foreign policy in Bangkok sought to revise Franco-Thai relations.

They declared themselves dissatisfied with what the had gained from the Franco-Thai Non-Aggression Pact. The agreement, together with its confidential correspondence, promised too little for growing Thai irredentist aspirations.

The Thais used the presence of Japanese troops in the north of Indo-China as an opportunity to revive their irredentist policy.

In effect, the Thais had designed on all of Cambodia and Laos including those parts which the French had acquired between 1867 and 1907.

Their interest in absorbing Cambodia and Laos was motivated by a fear of a revival of conflict with Vietnam and a desire to deny control of Laos and Cambodia to either Vietnam or Japan.

This view was reflected the Long-standing Thai strategic interest in Indo-China, sustained by prior dealings with Vietnam and later France.