12Franco-Thai Peace Convention of May 9, 1941

By the Franco-Thai Peace Convention of May 9, 1941, Thailand secured only a part of the territories in Laos and Cambodia which it had demanded and less than that which its armies were said to have occupied.

It recovered part of the territories lost to France in 1904 and 1907, but had to agree to the establishment of a demilitarized zone and to provide monetary compensation to France.

In consequence, there was a feeling in Thailand that Japan was a foe rather than a friend. This feeling derived from Thai dissatisfaction with Japan’s role as mediator and Japan’s evident determination to exercise influence over Thailand’s political and economic affairs.

11An Undeclared War Between Thailand and French Indo-China

When a balance of power was believed to be attained, the Thai Premier, who was backed by an effective propaganda campaign at home, employed force as an instrument of irredentist policy.

On November 18, 1940, an undeclared war between Thailand and French Indo-China broke out. The tide of war went against the French who tried but failed to reinforce their troops from other French territories.

Before Japan intervened diplomatically on January 20, 1941, the Thai Supreme Command claimed that they had occupied all the territories of Luang Prabang which Thailand claimed and an area in Cambodia extending 40 kilometers from the frontier.

Thai press reported alleged that all Laos and Cambodia would have been taken but for Japanese mediation which served to check Thai ambitions.

10Thai Premier’s Verbal Commitment to Japan

Colonel Luang Kharb Kunjara

Thai Premire's agent sent to Singapore

Because of this domestic political pressure, the Thai Premier, who wished to retain power, became determined to deal more closely with Japan.

In exchange for support for Thailand’s irredentist policy in Indo-China, he made a verbal commitment to Japan on October 1, 1940 to the effect that Thailand would no longer pursue a policy of neutrality but would allow its territory to be used by Japan in the latter’s plan to attack Malaya and Burma via Thailand.

To balance this verbal commitment to Japan, the Thai Premier contrived a week later to employ Great Britain as countervailing power.

He sent a secret agent, Colonel Luang Kharb Kunjara, to Singapore to assure the British military authorities that Thailand would resist Japan should she attempt to attack Malaya and Burma via Thailand.

09Thailand’s Offensive Diplomacy

Colonel Luang Phromyodhi

was engaged in this offensive diplomacy

 In these circumstances, the makers of foreign policy in Bangkok were provided with a good chance to play off one side against the other.

This tactic was employed in the full when the Phibunsonggram Government sent “Special Goodwill Missions” to the interested Powers.

In particular a “Special Goodwill Mission”, to Hanoi and Tokyo led by Deputy Minister of Defense and Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army Colonel Luang Phromyodhi, was engaged in this offensive diplomacy.

This mission did not succeed in persuading the French to accept Thailand’s offer of collaboration with the French against Japanese aggression in Indo-China in return for France retrocession to Thailand of two enclaves across from Luang Prabang and Pakse.

But, when the mission arrived in Tokyo in September 1940, it generated anxiety among the authorities in London that the mission might discuss Japan’s military demand on Thailand including the establishment of air and naval bases in Thai territory.

This anxiety contributed to the great advantage of Thailand in inducing Great Britain to adopt a flexible attitude towards the maintenance of the statys quo in Indo-China.

Britain became sympathetic to Thai demand for two enclaves across from Luang Prabang and Pakse. Despite Britain’s approval of Thailand’s “small-scale demands”, the Thais did not think that they could achieve these by entering into direct negotiations with the French.

Neither could Great Britain help the Thais; nor could the Thais change America’s rigid attitude towards the maintenance of the status quo in Indo-China

When the Phibunsonggram Government’s offensive diplomacy showed no prospect of achieving its irredentist aims, the Thai Army and Navy became dissatisfied with the Thai Premier’s conduct of foreign policy.

There were indications that resignation from office would be forced upon him. Should he be obliged to resign, an alternative choice of the Army and the Navy for the office of Prime Minister was either Vice-Admiral Sindhu Songgramchai, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, or Phaya Phahol, the former Prime Minister.

08The Thais regained territories in Laos and Cambodia

Demonstration of the Thai people

to support  their government

Thai determination to prosecute this irredentist policy provoked a crisis over the Indo-China-Thailand border and a short-lived war in which the Thais regained territories in Laos and Cambodia, which had been lost to France in 1904 and 1907.

It marked the first time since the colonial era that leaders had employed both diplomacy and force as means to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Initially, the Thai Government entered into direct negotiations with France. Then having failed to persuade the French to subscribe to its demands, the Thai Government adopted an offensive diplomacy.

Its objective was to draw the attention of other Powers to Thailand’s territorial demands. These Powers were Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy.

The Thais obtained a sympathetic response from Japan, Germany and Italy, which counter-balanced a hostile attitude from the United States and Great Britain. The interest of the latter two powers lay in the maintenance of the status quo in Indo-China in spite of the fact that Great Britain adopted a flexible attitude towards it.

07With the French Defeat in Europe, the Whole Situation in Indo-China Was Transformed

French Indo-China

With the French defeat in Europe in June 1940, the whole situation in Indo-China was transformed. The makers of foreign policy in Bangkok sought to revise Franco-Thai relations.

They declared themselves dissatisfied with what the had gained from the Franco-Thai Non-Aggression Pact. The agreement, together with its confidential correspondence, promised too little for growing Thai irredentist aspirations.

The Thais used the presence of Japanese troops in the north of Indo-China as an opportunity to revive their irredentist policy.

In effect, the Thais had designed on all of Cambodia and Laos including those parts which the French had acquired between 1867 and 1907.

Their interest in absorbing Cambodia and Laos was motivated by a fear of a revival of conflict with Vietnam and a desire to deny control of Laos and Cambodia to either Vietnam or Japan.

This view was reflected the Long-standing Thai strategic interest in Indo-China, sustained by prior dealings with Vietnam and later France.

06Readjustment the boundaries along the Mekong River

 

Mekong River

 

 

The French concession took the form of the agreement to readjust the boundaries along the Mekong River. Confidential and secret letters were exchanged when the Franco-Thai non-aggression pact was signed on June 12, 1940.

 

The contents of these letters were significant for they confirmed that France that France had agreed to move the Thai-Lao boundary along the Mekong River to the line of the thalweg and to recognize any territory on the western side of the thalweg as Thai.

In other words, any islets close to the Thai shore would belong to Thailand for administrative convenience although the Thais recognized all islands as part of French Indo-China.

05Non-Aggression Pacts and Treaty of Friendship Signed with Three Great Powers

French Indo-China

When Non-Aggression Pacts were signed on June 12, 1940 with Great Britain and France, a Treaty of Friendship was signed on the same day with Japan, the Phibunsonggram Government maintained the balance between Britain and Japan but clearly showed its determination to take advantage of France’s weak position to regain lost territories in Indo-China.

In negotiating the Non-Aggression Pact with the French, the Phibunsonggram Government took advantage of the friendly attitude of Britain to secure a concession from France. It profited from the tactic of playing off one enemy against another.

The success of this tactics was enhanced by Japan’s southward advance from China and the rise of Thai nationalism, irredentism and “Pan-Thaiism” at home.




These internal and external factors challenged the political positions of both Great Britain and France in Asia, and the two powers were obliged to come to terms with Thailand.

04The First Phibunsonggram’s Success in the Sphere of Foreign Affairs

French Indo-China

The first Phibunsonggram Government(1935-1944) had been highly successful in the sphere of foreign affairs. In addition to securing the retrocession of French Indo-Chinese territory in 1941, in 1943 it obtained the transfer by the Japanese of the Burmese Shan states of Kengtung and Mongpan and the Malay states of Kedah, Perlis,Trengganu and Kelantan.

The successful conduct of Thai foreign policy towards Indo-China was due in the main to efforts made by the Phibunsonggram Government to draw Japan into support of its irredentist policy. The foreign policy of Thailand, which had been centered on Great Britain and France, its powerful colonial neighbors, took into account a third important factor in the shape of the Japanese Empire.

In the circumstances, Thailand not only deferred to Japan, but also was ready to play it off against Great Britain and France, and vice versa. The Phibunsonggram Government sought to profit from the change in the regional balance of power particularly at the expense of France.

03Thailand’s Political and Strategic Interests in Indo-China (continued)

French Indo-China

Thirdly, interest in Indo-China was reinforced from latter part of the Nineteenth Century when the French became the dominant power in the Peninsular.

Moreover, the Thais were never reconciled to the cessations of territories in Laos and Cambodia which the French had ex-acted between 1867 and 1907.

From the Thai point of view, these territories were taken from Thailand by force or threat of force and they had a just case for their restoration. As a consequence, a strong anti-French feeling developed in Thailand and an irredentist movement arose to reclaim all territories that had at any time formed part of the Thai Kingdom

In conducting Thai foreign policy towards Indo-China in the period between 1938 and 1944, the Phibunsonggram Government shared the perception of Thailand’s political interest and the strategic calculation of its forebears.

Furthermore, in dealings with regional and extra-regional states, the Phibunsonggram Government inherited the traditional Thai Practice of the balance of power.

In foreign policy terms, this meant seeking to prevent undue dominance by maintaining a state of equilibrium between contending outside forces.

It also involved playing off one side against the other in order to achieve Thailand’s overall aim of maintaining its independence and protecting strategic interests in Indo-China.

02Thailand’s Political and Strategic Interests in Indo-China (continued)

French Indo-China

Secondly, Thailand posses an interest in Indo-China because the peoples of Laos and Cambodia had racial, religious and linguistic links with the Thais. The Lao people were akin to the Thais in race and religion. The Cambodians had religious, but not linguistic, links with Thailand.

They did not have either linguistic or religious ties with Vietnam, where the local form of Buddhism was Mahayana and not Hinayana. Moreover Thai rulers held the belief that Laos and Cambodia, with their shortage of harbors and poor communications, would not be able to maintain their independence. They would be absorbed either by Thailand or Vietnam.

But, given their common race, religion, way of life and economic links with the Thais, Laos and Cambodia would more likely turn to Thailand rather than Vietnam. Given this view, the Thai rulers were keen to integrate Laos and Cambodia into Thailand to prevent their adversary from assuming regional dominance. But, if their goal could not be realized, they hoped to maintain a “buffer zone" in Laos and Cambodia interposed between Vietnam.

01Thailand’s Political and Strategic Interests in Indo-China

French Indo-China

Thailand’s foreign policy towards French-Indo-China in the period between 1938 and 1950 was formulated and executed by Thai leaders who  took special account of their country’s long-standing political and strategic interests in that Peninsular.

First, Thailand possesses and interest in Indo-China because of its longstanding strategic importance. For several hundred years Indo-China had been a pawn in a competition for power and security between Thailand and Vietnam.

In the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries in particular, these two rival states were in contention for control over Cambodia and Laos. In their dealings with Vietnam, Thai rulers regarded Laos (as a geographical expression) and Cambodia as the key to the security of Thailand.

The importance of these two small neighboring states derived from their geographical position, the use of which by enemy would posed a serious threat to Thailand’s independence and territorial integrity. The danger arising from a strong, hostile power established in strength in Indo-China as a whole was confirmed when Thai rulers were obliged to deal with France who replaced Vietnam as Thailand’s adversary.

Thus apart from the importance of Burma, Indo-China constituted the key to Thai security interest in the area as a whole. In classical balance of power practice, Thailand was concerned either to exercise control itself over Laos and Cambodia or to deny control of these two states to any third state, eastablished in Indo-China